← Collaboration in German-occupied Poland

Rejected candidate redline · 2018-07-01 → 2019-01-01

The peak intervalThe snapshot interval with the largest persistence-weighted loss in a wider episode. measured 31% persistence-weighted loss. Read it like tracked changes: struck-out text was removed; highlighted text was added (color hints which account added it).

Exact checking rejected this candidate. This is the coarse candidate window, not the exact event pair. Something to inspect — not a finished judgment.

Throughout World War II, Poland was a member of the Allied coalition that fought Nazi Germany. During the German occupation of Poland, some Polish citizens of diverse ethnicities collaborated with the Germans. Estimates of the number of collaborators vary. The main collaborators were members of Poland's German minority.Ryszard Kaczmarek Kolaboracja na terenach wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 7/1 (12), page 166, 2008 During and after the war, the Polish State and the Resistance movement executed collaborators. Due to differences in Nazi Germany's aims in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, and due to Germany's historical Drang nach Osten ("Drive to the East") and Lebensraum ("living space") policies, collaboration in Poland was much less widespread and institutionalized than in Western Europe. Compared to the situations in other German-occupied countries, collaboration in Poland was marginal. Background Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler sought to establish Poland as a client state, proposing a multilateral territorial exchange and an extension of the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. During and after the war, the Polish State and the Resistance movement punished collaborators, with thousands sentenced to death. Collaboration in Poland was less institutionalized than elsewhere in Europe, and has been described by some as marginal Background Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler sought to establish Poland as a client state, proposing a multilateral territorial exchange and an extension of the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Polish government, fearing subjugation to Nazi Germany, instead chose to form an alliance with Britain (and later with France). In response, Germany withdrew from the non-aggression pact and, shortly before invading Poland, signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Soviet Union, safeguarding Germany against Soviet retaliation if it invaded Poland, and prospectively dividing Poland between the two totalitarian powers. On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The German army overran Polish defenses while inflicting heavy civilian losses, and by 13 September had conquered most of western Poland. On 17 September the Soviet Union invaded the country from the east, conquering most of eastern Poland, along with the Baltic states and parts of Finland. Some 140,000 Polish soldiers and airmen escaped to Romania and Hungary, and later many soon joining the Polish Armed Forces in France. Poland's government crossed over into Romania, later forming a government-in-exile in France and then in London, following the French capitulation. Poland as a polity never surrendered to the Germans. Nazi authorities annexed the westernmost parts of Poland and the former Free City of Danzig, incorporating it directly to Nazi Germany, and placed the remaining German-occupied territory under the administration of the newly formed General Government. The Soviet Union annexed the rest of Poland, incorporating its territories into the Belorussian and Ukrainian Soviet republics. Germany’s primary aim in Eastern Europe was the expansion of the German Lebensraum which necessitated according to Nazi views the elimination or deportation of all non-Germanic ethnicities, including Poles; the areas controlled by the General Government were to become "free" of Poles within 15–20 years. The Soviet Union annexed the rest of Poland, incorporating its territories into the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet republics. Germany's primary aim in Eastern Europe was the expansion of the German Lebensraum which necessitated according to Nazi views the elimination or deportation of all non-Germanic ethnicities, including Poles; the areas controlled by the General Government were to become "free" of Poles within 15–20 years. This resulted in harsh policies which targeted the Polish population, in addition to the explicit goal of exterminating Polish Jews, which was carried out by Nazi Germany in the occupied Polish territories. Individual collaboration right|thumb|German Polish-language recruitment poster: "'Let's do farm work in Germany!' See your wójt at once." thumb|249x249px|Polish resistance poster announcing the execution of several Polish collaborators and blackmailers (szmalcowniks), September 1943 Estimates of the number of Polish collaborators vary due to varying interpretations of what constitutes collaboration. Low estimates place the number of collaborators at about 17,000, relying on the number of death sentences for treason issued by Special Courts of the Polish Underground State; Leszek Gondek describes this form of collaboration as "marginal". According to historian Leszek Gondek, the courts heard at least 5,000 collaboration cases and sentenced 3,500 (according to historian Czesław Madajczyk, over 10,000) people to death for collaboration. Higher estimates include "labor service" (Baudienst) workers, low-ranking Polish functionaries, the Polish Blue Police, Polish citizens who declared themselves ethnically-German Volksdeutsche (usually under duress, in those areas of prewar Poland that were now incorporated into Germany), and Poland's peasants—a socioeconomic class that benefitted from the wartime redistribution of wealth and often followed German directives. Poland’s German minority in 1939 totaled some 750,000 and was the principal group of Polish-citizen collaborators.Ryszard Kaczmarek, "Kolaboracja na terenach wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej", Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, 7/1 (12), 2008, p. 166. Madajczyk also estimates that 5% of the population in the General Government actively collaborated, as compared with 25% who actively resisted the occupation as members of resistance groups.Czesław Madajczyk, Kann man in Polen 1939-1945 von Kollaborationsprechen, okupation und Kollaboration 1938-1945. Individual collaboration right|thumb|German Polish-language recruitment poster: "'Let's do farm work in Germany!' See your wójt at once." Estimates of the number of individual Polish collaborators vary according to the definition of "collaboration". Estimates range from as few as 17,000 (by historian Leszek Gondek, who extrapolates from the number of death sentences handed out by the Special Courts of the resistance); to as many as several hundred thousand (including Polish officials employed by the German authorities; Blue Police officers; "labor service" workers; members of Poland's German minority; and even Poland's peasantry, which benefited from the wartime economy and tended to follow German orders). Czesław Madajczyk estimates that 5% of the population in the General Government actively collaborated, which he contrasts with the 25% who actively resisted the occupation.Czesław Madajczyk, Kann man in Polen 1939-1945 von Kollaborationsprechen, okupation und Kollaboration 1938-1945. Beitrage zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik, Berlin, Heidelberg, W. Rohr, 1994, p. 140. Historian John Connelly writes that "only a relatively small percentage of the Polish population engaged in activities that may be described as collaboration, when seen against the backdrop of European and world history." Postwar statistics of the Israeli War Crimes Commission gave the number of Polish collaborators at around 7,000. The Baudienst ("labor service") was instituted in May 1940 as a form of national service that combined hard labor with Nazi indoctrination. In some places it was a prerequisite for higher education, and it was rewarded with pocket money. Starting in April 1942, evasion of Baudienst service was punishable with death, and by 1944 Baudienst numbers had grown to some 45,000. Baudienst workers were sometimes deployed in support of German aktions (operations) of deportation or murder of Jews, including the blockading of Jewish quarters and the searching of Jewish homes. For such operational support, they were rewarded with vodka and cigarettes. Ethnographic groups thumb|Wacław Krzeptowski, prominent Goralenvolk collaborator, visiting German governor Hans Frank during a celebration held in honor of Hitler's birthday The Germans also singled out, as potential collaborators, two ethnographic groups in Poland which had some limited separatist interests. The scheme was directed at the Kashubians in the north and the Gorals in the south. The German attempt to reach out to the Kashubians proved a "complete failure", but in the south the Germans met with limited success, and Katarzyna Szurmiak has called the resulting Goralenvolk movement "the most extensive case of collaboration in Poland during the Second World War." Still, Szurmiak writes, "when talking about numbers, the attempt to create Goralenvolk was a failure... a mere 18 percent of the population took up Goralian IDs... Goralian schools [were] consistently boycotted, and... attempts to create Goralian police or a Goralian Waffen-SS Legion... failed miserably." Political collaboration Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborationist governments, in occupied Poland there was no puppet government. Historian John Connelly writes that "only a relatively small percentage of the Polish population engaged in activities that may be described as collaboration, when seen against the backdrop of European and world history." However, he criticizes the same population for its indifference to the Jewish plight, a phenomenon he terms "structural collaboration" (see more below). Political collaboration Unlike the situation in most German-occupied European countries where the Germans successfully installed collaborationist governments, in occupied Poland there was no puppet government. The Germans had initially considered the creation of a collaborationist Polish cabinet to administer, as a protectorate, the occupied Polish territories that had not been annexed outright into the Third Reich. At the beginning of the war, German officials contacted several Polish leaders with proposals for collaboration, but the Poles refused the offers. A prominent peasant-party leader and former Prime Minister of Poland, Wincenty Witos, rejected several German offers to lead a puppet government, as did Janusz Radziwiłł and Stanisław Estreicher. The pro-German right-wing politician, Andrzej Świetlicki, formed the National Revolutionary Camp and approached the Germans with a collaboration offer but was ignored. Władysław Studnicki, an anti-Soviet publicist, and Leon Kozłowski, a prominent scholar and former Prime Minister, each favored Polish-German cooperation against the Soviet Union, but was rejected by the Germans. Nazi racial policies and German plans for the conquered Polish territories, on one hand, and Polish anti-German attitudes on the other, militated against any Polish-German political collaboration. No further consideration was given to forming a Polish collaborative arrangement after April 1940, when Hitler banned negotiations concerning any degree of Polish autonomy. German plans envisioned the eventual complete disappearance of the Polish nation, which was to be replaced by German settlers."Just before the outbreak of the Second World War, Hitler spoke of the planned mass murder of Poles and asked, 'Who, after all, is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?'... At the beginning of the war German officials contacted several Polish leaders with proposals for collaboration, but they all refused. Among those who rejected the German offers were Wincenty Witos, peasant party leader and former Prime Minister; Prince Janusz Radziwiłł; and Stanisław Estreicher, prominent scholar from the Jagiellonian University. In 1940, during the German invasion of France, the French government suggested that Polish politicians in France negotiate an accommodation with Germany; and in Paris the prominent journalist Stanislaw Mackiewicz tried to get Polish President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz to negotiate with the Germans, as the French defenses were collapsing and German victory seemed inevitable. Three days later the Polish Government and Polish National Council rejected discussing capitulation and declared they would fight on until full victory over Nazi Germany. A group of eight low-ranking Polish politicians and officers broke with the Polish Government and in Lisbon, Portugal, addressed a memorandum to Germany, asking for discussions about restoring a Polish state under German occupation, which was rejected by the Germans. According to Czeslaw Madajczyk, in view of the low profile of the Poles involved and of Berlin's rejection of the memorandum, no political collaboration can be said to have taken place.Czeslaw Madajczyk "Nie chciana kolaboracja. Polscy politycy i nazistowskie Niemcy w Lipcu 1940", Bernard Wiaderny, Paryz 2002, Dzieje Najnowsze 35/2 226-229 2003 The Nazi racial policies and Germany's plans for the conquered Polish territories, on one hand, and Polish anti-German attitudes on the other, combined to prevent any Polish-German political collaboration. The Nazis envisioned the eventual disappearance of the Polish nation, which was to be replaced by German settlers."Just before the outbreak of the Second World War, Hitler spoke of the planned mass murder of Poles and asked, 'Who, after all, is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?'... Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine would be populated by [German] pioneer farmer-soldier families." Alex Ross, "The Hitler Vortex: How American racism influenced Nazi thought", The New Yorker, 30 April 2018, pp. 71–72. During the 1940 German invasion of France, the French government suggested that Polish politicians in France negotiate an accommodation with Germany; and in Paris the prominent journalist Stanislaw Mackiewicz tried to get Polish President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz to negotiate with the Germans, as the French defenses were collapsing and German victory seemed inevitable. Three days later the Polish Government and Polish National Council rejected discussing capitulation and declared they would fight on until full victory over Nazi Germany. A group of eight low-ranking Polish politicians and officers broke with the Polish Government and in Lisbon, Portugal, addressed a memorandum to Germany, asking for discussions about restoring a Polish state under German occupation, which was rejected by the Germans. According to Czeslaw Madajczyk, in view of the low profile of the Poles involved and of Berlin's rejection of the memorandum, no political collaboration can be said to have taken place.Czeslaw Madajczyk "Nie chciana kolaboraca. Polscy politycy i nazistowskie Niemcy w Lipcu 1940", Bernard Wiaderny, Paryz 2002, Dzieje Najnowsze 35/2 226-229 2003 For his efforts, Mackiewicz was sentenced to death by the Polish resistance (but survived to return to Poland after the war). Security forces thumb|upright|German General Government poster requiring former Polish Police officers (Blue Police) to report for duty under the German Ordnungspolizei or face "severe" punishment The main security forces in German-occupied Poland were some 550,000 soldiers and 80,000 SS and police officials sent from Germany.Czesław Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, Warsaw, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970, vol. In April 1940 Hitler banned any negotiations concerning any degree of autonomy for the Poles, and no further consideration was given to the idea. Shortly after the German occupation began, pro-German right-wing politician Andrzej Świetlicki formed an organization - the National Revolutionary Camp - and approached the Germans with various offers of collaboration, which they ignored. Świetlicki was arrested and executed in 1940. Władysław Studnicki, another nationalist maverick politician and anti-communist publicist, and Leon Kozłowski, a former Prime Minister, each favored Polish-German cooperation against the Soviet Union, but they too were rejected by the Germans. Security forces thumb|upright|German General Government poster requiring former Polish Police officers (Blue Police) to report for duty under the German Ordnungspolizei or face "severe" punishment The main security forces in German-occupied Poland were some 550,000 soldiers and 80,000 SS and police officials sent from Germany.Czesław Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, Warsaw, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970, vol. 1, p. 242. In October 1939 the German authorities ordered mobilization of the prewar Polish police to serve under the German Ordnungspolizei, thus creating the auxiliary "Blue Police" that supplemented the principal German forces. Blue Police In October 1939 the German authorities ordered mobilization of the prewar Polish police to serve under the German Ordnungspolizei, thus creating the auxiliary "Blue Police" that supplemented the principal German forces. The Polish policemen were to report for duty by 10 November 1939 or face death. At its peak in May 1944, the Blue Police numbered some 17,000 men. Their primary task was to act as a regular police force dealing with criminal activities, but the Germans also used them in combating smuggling and resistance, rounding up random civilians (łapanka) for forced labor or for execution in reprisal for Polish resistance activities (e.g., the Polish underground's execution of Polish traitors or egregiously brutal Germans), patrolling for Jewish ghetto escapees, and in support of military operations against the Polish resistance. The German General Government tried to form additional Polish auxiliary police units—Schutzmannschaft Battalion 202 in 1942, and Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 in 1943. Very few men volunteered, and the Germans were compelled to forcibly conscript men to fill out the ranks. Subsequently most of the men deserted, and the two units were disbanded. Very few men volunteered, and the Germans decided on forced conscription to fill their ranks. Most of the conscripts subsequently deserted, and the two units were disbanded. Schutzmannschaft Battalion 107 mutinied against its German officers, disarmed them, and joined the Home Army resistance.Józef Turowski, Pożoga: Walki 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji AK, PWN, , pp. 154-155. In 1944, in the General Government, Germany attempted to recruit 12,000 Polish volunteers to "join the fight against Bolshevism". The campaign failed; only 699 men were recruited, 209 of whom either deserted or were disqualified for health reasons.Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk, "Pomiędzy współpracą a zdradą. Problem kolaboracji w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie – próba syntezy", Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość: biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, 1427-7476, 2009, no. 1, p. 113. Poles in the Wehrmacht thumb|180x180px|A Pole (now a POW) who had been forcibly conscripted into the German Army, speaks with Polish 1st Armoured Division soldiers in Normandy. The campaign failed; only 699 men were recruited, 209 of whom either deserted or were disqualified for health reasons.<ref name=Mlyn>{{cite journal|author=Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk|title=Pomiędzy współpracą a zdradą. Problem kolaboracji w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie – próba syntezy|url=http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-85b5ca50-5e60-47e3-83a5-3a0c9d6c452f/c/103-132_Mlynarczyk.pd|journal=Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość: biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej|issue=1(14)|date=2009|page=113}}</ref> Poles in the Wehrmacht thumb|upright|A Pole (now a POW) who had been forcibly conscripted into the German Army, speaks with Polish 1st Armoured Division soldiers in Normandy. Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, many former citizens of the Second Polish Republic from across the Polish territories annexed by Nazi Germany were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht in Upper Silesia and in Pomerania. They were declared citizens of the Third Reich by law and therefore subject to drumhead court-martial in case of draft evasion. Professor Ryszard Kaczmarek of the University of Silesia in Katowice, author of a monograph, Polacy w Wehrmachcie (Poles in the Wehrmacht), noted that the scale of this phenomenon was much larger than previously assumed, because 90% of the inhabitants of these two westernmost regions of prewar Poland were ordered to register on the German People's List (Volksliste), regardless of their wishes. The exact number of these conscripts is not known; no data exist beyond 1943. In June 1946, the British Secretary of State for War reported to Parliament that, of the pre-war Polish citizens who had involuntarily signed the Volksliste and subsequently served in the German Wehrmacht, 68,693 men were captured or surrendered to the Allies in northwest Europe. The overwhelming majority, 53,630 subsequently enlisted in the Polish Army in the West and fought against Germany to the end of World War II. Collaboration and resistance The main armed resistance organization in Poland was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK), numbering some 400,000 members, including Jewish fighters.Edward Kossoy Zydzi w Powstaniu WarszawskimPowstanie warszawskie w walce i dyplomacji - page 23 Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny, Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert - 2005 Był również czterdziestoosobowy pluton żydowski, dowodzony przez Samuela Kenigsweina, który walczył w batalionie AK „Wigry" The Home Army command rejected any talks with the German authorities, but some Home Army units in eastern Poland did maintain contacts with the Germans in order to gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and perhaps acquire needed weapons.Review by John Radzilowski of Yaffa Eliach's There Once Was a World: A 900-Year Chronicle of the Shtetl of Eishyshok, in Journal of Genocide Research, vol. Compulsory civilian service (Baudienst) In May 1940 the Germans instituted a Baudienst ("construction service") in several districts of the General Government, as a form of compulsory national service that combined hard labor with Nazi indoctrination. Service was rewarded with pocket money, and in some places it was a prerequisite for occupational training. Starting in April 1942, evasion of Baudienst service was punishable by death. By 1944, Baudienst strength had grown to some 45,000 servicemen.Antoni Mączak, Encyklopedia historii gospodarczej Polski do 1945 roku: O-Ż (Encyclopedia of Poland's Economic History: O–Ż), Warsaw, Wiedza Powszechna, 1981. Baudienst servicemen were sometimes deployed in support of aktions (roundup of Jews for deportation or extermination), for example to blockade Jewish quarters or to search Jewish homes for hideaways and valuables. After such operations the servicemen were rewarded with vodka and cigarettes. Disobedience while in "service" was punished with commitment to punitive camps. There were three Baudienst branches: Polnischer Baudienst (Polish Labor Service) Ukrainischer Heimatdienst (Ukrainian National Service) Goralischer Heimatdienst (Goral National Service) Cultural collaboration Film and theater In occupied Poland there was no Polish film industry. However, a few former Polish citizens collaborated with the Germans in making films such as the 1941 anti-Polish propaganda film Heimkehr (Homecoming). In that film, casting for minor parts played by Polish actors was done by Volksdeutscher actor and Gestapo agent Igo Sym, who during the filming, on 7 March 1941, was shot in his Warsaw apartment by the Polish Union of Armed Struggle resistance movement; after the war, the Polish performers were sentenced for collaboration in an anti-Polish propaganda undertaking, with punishments ranging from official reprimand to imprisonment. Some Polish actors were coerced by the Germans into performing, as in the case of Bogusław Samborski, who played in Heimkehr probably in order to save his Jewish wife. During the occupation, feature-film showings were preceded by propaganda newsreels of Die Deutsche Wochenschau (The German Weekly Review). Some feature films likewise contained Nazi propaganda. The Polish underground discouraged Poles from attending movies, advising them, in the words of the rhymed couplet, "Tylko świnie siedzą w kinie" ("Only swine go to the movies"). Following the Polish underground's execution of Igo Sym, in reprisal the Germans took hostages and, on 11 March 1941, executed 21 at their Palmiry killing grounds. They also arrested several actors and theater directors and sent them to Auschwitz, including such notable figures as Stefan Jaracz and Leon Schiller. The largest theater for Polish audiences was Warsaw's Komedia (Comedy). There were also a dozen small theaters. Polish actors were forbidden by the underground to perform in these theaters, but some did and were punished after the war. Many other actors supported themselves by working as waiters. Adolf Dymsza performed in legal cabarets and wasn't allowed to perform at Warsaw during a short period after the war. A theater producer Zygmunt Ipohorski-Lenkiewicz was shot as a Gestapo agent. Press The legal press in German-occupied Poland was a German propaganda tool, which Poles called ("reptile press"). Poles publishing legal newspapers or writing for them were considered collaborators; many respected journalists refused to work for the Germans. Alfred Szklarski, a writer who would become popular after the war, during the war wrote for the German-published Polish-language Nowy Kurier Warszawski (New Warsaw Courier) and in 1949 was tried for collaborating with the Germans. Sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, he was released after serving 4 years. Jan Emil Skiwski, a writer and journalist of extreme National Democrat and fascist orientation, collaborated with Germany, publishing pro-Nazi Polish newspapers in German-occupied Poland. Toward war's end, he escaped advancing Soviet armies, fled Europe, and spent the rest of his life under an assumed name in Venezuela. During the German occupation of Wilno, Józef Mackiewicz was accused of collaboration with the Germans. He was sentenced to death by a Polish underground tribunal but survived the war and was exonerated in 1947. Collaboration and the resistance thumb|249x249px|Polish resistance poster announcing the execution of several Polish collaborators and blackmailers (szmalcowniks), September 1943 The main armed resistance organization in Poland was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK), numbering some 400,000 members, including Jewish fighters.Edward Kossoy Zydzi w Powstaniu WarszawskimPowstanie warszawskie w walce i dyplomacji - page 23 Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny, Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert - 2005 Był również czterdziestoosobowy pluton żydowski, dowodzony przez Samuela Kenigsweina, który walczył w batalionie AK „Wigry" The Home Army command rejected any talks with the German authorities, but some Home Army units in eastern Poland did maintain contacts with the Germans in order to gain intelligence on German morale and preparedness and perhaps acquire needed weapons.Review by John Radzilowski of Yaffa Eliach's There Once Was a World: A 900-Year Chronicle of the Shtetl of Eishyshok, in Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1999), City University of New York. The Germans made several attempts at arming regional Home Army units in order to encourage them to act against Soviet partisans operating in the Nowogródek and Vilnius areas. Local Home Army units accepted arms but used them for their own purposes, disregarding the Germans’ intents and even turning the weapons against the Germans. Local Home Army units accepted arms but used them for their own purposes, disregarding the Germans' intents and even turning the weapons against the Germans. Rimantas Zizas. Armijos Krajovos veikla Lietuvoje 1942–1944 metais (Activities of Armia Krajowa in Lithuania in 1942–1944). Armija Krajova Lietuvoje, pp. 14–39. A. Bubnys, K. Garšva, E. Gečiauskas, J. Lebionka, J. Saudargienė, R. Zizas (editors). Vilnius – Kaunas, 1995. Tadeusz Piotrowski concludes that "[these deals] were purely tactical, short-term arrangements" and quotes Joseph Rothschild that "the Polish Home Army was by and large untainted by collaboration." The anti-communist National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, or NSZ) from time to time attacked or took prisoner Jewish partisans who were part of the communist People’s Army (Armia Ludowa, or AL), a Polish partisan militia that included Jewish detachments. For a few months in 1944, a single NSZ unit, the Holy Cross Mountains Brigade, numbering 800-1,500 fighters, ceased operations against the Germans, accepted their logistical help, and with German consent, to avoid capture by the Soviets, withdrew from Poland into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Once there, the Brigade resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the Holýšov concentration camp, freeing several hundred Jewish women.Jerzy Jaxa-Maderski, Na dwa fronty: szkice z walk Brygady Świętokrzyskiej NSZ, Wydawnictwo Retro, 1995, p. 19. The NSZ did not have a uniform view about Jews and, though generally considered antisemitic and though involved in killing and handing over Jews, also incorporated Jewish fighters, including ones in higher command positions. Some NSZ members and units rescued Jews and received postwar Righteous among the Nations recognition. The Holocaust thumbnail|Part of the core exhibition dedicated to Jedwabne pogrom at the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw. Tadeusz Piotrowski concludes that "[these deals] were purely tactical, short-term arrangements" and quotes Joseph Rothschild that "the Polish Home Army was by and large untainted by collaboration." The Polish right-wing National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, or NSZ) – a nationalist, anti-communist organization, widely perceived as anti-Semitic – did not have a uniform policy regarding Jews. Its attitude to them drew on anti-semitism and anti-communism, perceiving Jewish partisans and refugees as "pro-Soviet elements" and members of an ethnicity foreign to the Polish nation. Except in rare cases, the NSZ did not admit Jews, and on several occasions killed or delivered Jewish partisans to the German authorities and murdered Jewish refugees. NSZ units also frequently skirmished with partisans of the Polish communist People's Army (Armia Ludowa). At least two NSZ units operated with the acquiescence or cooperation of the Germans at different times. In late 1944, in the face of advancing Soviet forces, the Holy Cross Mountains Brigade, numbering 800-1,500 fighters, decided to cooperate with the Germans. It ceased hostilities against them, accepted their logistical help, and coordinated its retreat to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Once there, the unit resumed hostilities against the Germans and on 5 May 1945 liberated the Holýšov concentration camp. Another NSZ unit known to collaborate with the Germans was Hubert Jura's unit, also known as Tom's Organization, which operated in the Radom district. The Communist underground (PPR, GL) informed the Nazis about Home Army members. 200 of them were arrested. The Germans found a Commmunist printing shop as a result of one of such denunciations made by Marian Spychalski.Komunistyczny donos do gestapo The Holocaust thumbnail|Part of the core exhibition dedicated to Jedwabne pogrom at the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw. Historian Martin Winstone writes that only a minority of Poles took part either in persecuting or in helping Jews. He compares Poland with other occupied countries and asserts that the tendency not to help was due more to human nature than to ethnocentrism. He compares Poland with other occupied countries and asserts the largest part of society was indifferent. Regarding the purported low Polish resolve to save Jews, Winstone writes that this tendency may be partly explained by fear of execution by the Germans. He nevertheless notes that the Germans imposed death for many other acts as well and that "it may well be that the risk of hiding a Jew was greater, but that is in itself suggestive since the Germans were not the only danger". He nevertheless notes that the Germans imposed death sentences for many other acts and cites Alexander Donat: Poles "were threatened with death not only for sheltering Jews, but for many other things...[but] they kept right on doing them. Why was it that only helping Jews scared them?" Winstone comments, "it may well be that the risk of hiding a Jew was greater, but that is in itself suggestive since the Germans were not the only danger"; he goes on to explain that Poles who had helped Jews were afraid of repercussions even after liberation. Sociologist Jan Gross writes that a leading role in the 1941 Jedwabne pogrom was carried out by four Polish men, including Jerzy Laudański and Karol Bardoń, who had earlier collaborated with the Soviet NKVD and were now trying to recast themselves as zealous collaborators with the Germans.Gross (2001), Neighbors, p. 75. Historian John Connelly wrote that the vast majority of ethnic Poles showed indifference to the fate of the Jews; and that "Polish historiography has hesitated to view [complicity in the Holocaust of Jews] as collaboration... [instead viewing it] as a form of society's 'demoralization'". Klaus-Peter Friedrich wrote that "most [Poles] adopted a policy of wait-and-see... In the eyes of the Jewish population, [this] almost inevitably had to appear as silent approval of the [German] occupier's actions." According to historian Gunnar S. Paulsson, in occupied Warsaw (a city of 1.3 million, including 350,000 Jews before the war), some 3,000 to 4,000 Poles acted as blackmailers and informants (szmalcowniks) who turned in Jews and fellow Poles who provided assistance to them. In 2013 historian Jan Grabowski wrote in his book Hunt for the Jews that 200,000 Jews "were killed directly or indirectly by the Poles." (In a later interview, he clarified that this number included cases where Poles were co-responsible for the deaths, even if the Germans did the actual killing).Mirosław Maciorowski, "Prof. Jan Grabowski: Pomagaliśmy Niemcom zabijać Żydów". "Nigdy nie mówiłem o 200 tys. Żydów zamordowanych własnoręcznie przez Polaków", Gazeta Wyborcza. Retrieved 2018-05-06. The book won the Yad Vashem International Book Prize"Hunt for the Jews snags Yad Vashem book prize", Times of Israel (JTA), 8 December 2014."Professor Jan Grabowski wins the 2014 Yad Vashem International Book Prize", Yad Vashem, 4 December 2014. but sparked controversy in Poland, and the estimate was criticized by some historians and by the Polish Antidefamation League. In response, the Polish Center for Holocaust Research in Warsaw, Poland, co-founded by Grabowski, and a group of international Holocaust scholars published letters defending Grabowski. According to statements by Poland's ambassador to Switzerland, Jakub Kumoch, reported in the Polish internet portal wPolityce and in the weekly news magazine Do Rzeczy, "Grabowski admitted that the number of fugitives from the ghettos, 250,000, is based solely on his own estimates and selective treatment of Szymon Datner's writings. Grabowski simply accepted the maximum number of ghetto escapees suggested by Datner but rejected Datner's estimate of the number of survivors. According to Grabowski, if you subtract the number of survivors (in his opinion, only 50,000) from the number of fugitives, you get 200,000. Grabowski therefore stated this number as Jews murdered by Poles." An article in the Polish nationwide daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita (The Republic) critiqued Grabowski: "Grabowski... has difficulty demonstrating, in his journalistic statements, that every Jew who escaped German transports was murdered because of Polish 'complicity'." Collaboration by ethnic minorities Germans used the divide and rule method to create tensions within the Polish society, by targeting several non-Polish ethnic groups for preferential treatment or the opposite, in the case of the Jewish minority. Ethnic Germans thumb|Meeting of German minority (Volksdeutsche) in occupied Warsaw, 1940 During the invasion of Poland in September 1939, members of the ethnic German minority in Poland assisted Nazi Germany in its war effort. Paulsson, in occupied Warsaw (a city of 1.3 million, including 350,000 Jews before the war), some 3,000 to 4,000 Poles acted as blackmailers and informants (szmalcowniks) who turned in Jews and fellow-Poles who provided assistance to Jews. In 2013, historian Jan Grabowski wrote in his book Hunt for the Jews that 200,000 Jews "were killed directly or indirectly by the Poles." The book was praised by some scholars for its approach and analysis,"Hunt for the Jews snags Yad Vashem book prize", Times of Israel (JTA), 8 December 2014."Professor Jan Grabowski wins the 2014 Yad Vashem International Book Prize", Yad Vashem, 4 December 2014. while a number of other historians criticized his methodology for lacking in actual field research, and argued that his "200,000" estimate was too high.Musial, Bogdan (2011). "Judenjagd – 'umiejętne działanie' czy zbrodnicza perfidia?"". Dzieje Najnowsze: kwartalnik poświęcony historii XX wieku (in Polish). Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences.Samsonowska, Krystyna (July 2011). "Dąbrowa Tarnowska - nieco inaczej. (Dąbrowa Tarnowska - not quite like that)". Więź. 7: 75–85. Collaboration by ethnic minorities Germans used the divide and rule method to create tensions within the Polish society, by targeting several non-Polish ethnic groups for preferential treatment or the opposite, in the case of the Jewish minority. German collaborators thumb|Meeting of German minority (Volksdeutsche) in occupied Warsaw, 1940 thumb|Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz leaders in Bydgoszcz, 1939 During the invasion of Poland in September 1939, members of the ethnic German minority in Poland assisted Nazi Germany in its war effort. They committed sabotage, diverted regular forces and committed numerous atrocities against civilian population.Maria Wardzyńska, Był rok 1939 Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Intelligenzaktion, IPN Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2009 Shortly after the German invasion of Poland, an armed ethnic-German militia, called the Selbstschutz, numbering around 100,000 members, was formed.Michael Geyer, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. Intelligenzaktion, IPN Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2009 Shortly after the German invasion of Poland, an armed ethnic-German militia, called the Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz, numbering around 100,000 members, was formed.Michael Geyer, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 155. It organized the Operation Tannenberg mass murder of Polish elites. At the beginning of 1940, the Selbstschutz was disbanded, and its members transferred to various units of SS, Gestapo, and German police. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle organized large-scale looting of property, and redistributed goods to Volksdeutsche. They were given apartments, workshops, farms, furniture, and clothing confiscated from Jewish Poles and ethnic Poles.August Frank, "Memorandum, September 26, 1942, Utilization of property on the occasion of settlement and evacuation of Jews" in NO-724, Pros. Ex. 472. United States of America v. Oswald Pohl, et al. (Case No. 4, the "Pohl Trial). V. pp. 965–967. During the German occupation of Poland, Nazi authorities established the German People's List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL), whereby former Polish citizens of German ethnicity were registered as Volksdeutsche. The German authorities encouraged registration of ethnic Germans, and in many cases made it mandatory. Those who joined were given benefits, including better food and better social status. However, Volksdeutsche were required to perform military service for the Third Reich, and hundreds of thousands joined the German military, either willingly or under compulsion.Historia Encyklopedia Szkolna, Warsaw, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1993, pp. 357–58. thumb|Parade of Ukrainian recruits from Galicia joining SS-Galizien division in Lwów (Lviv), 18 July 1943 Collaboration by Ukrainians and Belorussians Before the war, Poland had a substantial population of Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities living in her eastern, Kresy regions. thumb|Parade of Ukrainian recruits from Galicia joining SS-Galizien division in Lwów (Lviv), 18 July 1943 According to Ryszard Kaczmarek, Poland's German minority totaled some 750,000 in 1939 and was the principal group of citizen collaborators. Ukrainians and Belarusians Before the war, Poland had a substantial population of Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities living in her eastern, Kresy regions. After the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, those territories were annexed by the USSR. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, German authorities recruited Ukrainians and Belorussians who had been citizens of Poland before September 1939 for service in Waffen-SS and auxiliary-police units. Already in 1939, during the September Campaign, the OUN had been “a faithful German auxiliary.”John A. Armstrong, Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1968), p. 409. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, German authorities recruited Ukrainians and Belarusians who had been citizens of Poland before September 1939 for service in Waffen-SS and auxiliary-police units. In District Galicia, the SS Galicia division and Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, made up of ethnic-Ukrainian volunteers, took part in widespread massacres and persecution of Poles and Jews.Czesław Partacz, Krzysztof Łada, Polska wobec ukraińskich dążeń niepodległościowych w czasie II wojny światowej, (Toruń: Centrum Edukacji Europejskiej, 2003)Timothy Snyder. (2004) The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: pp. 165–166 Collaboration by Jews thumb|Two Jewish Ghetto Police functionaries guarding the gates of the Warsaw Ghetto, June 1942 The Judenräte (s. 165–166 Jewish collaborators thumb|Two Jewish Ghetto policemen guarding the gates of the Warsaw Ghetto, June 1942 A minority of Jews chose to collaborate with the Germans. Jews helped the Germans in return for limited freedom, safety and other compensations (food, money) for the collaborators and their relatives. Some were motivated purely by self-interests such as individual survival, revenge and greed; others were coerced into collaborating with the Germans. The Judenräte (s. Judenrat, literally "Jewish council") were Jewish-run governing bodies set up by the Nazi authorities in Jewish ghettos across German-occupied Poland. The Judenräte functioned as a self-enforcing intermediary and were used by the Germans to control the Jewish population and to manage the ghetto's day-to-day administration. The Germans also required Judenräte to confiscate property, organize forced labor, collect information on the Jewish population and facilitate deportations to extermination camps. In some cases, Judenrat members exploited their positions to engage in bribery and other abuses. In the Łódź Ghetto, the reign of Judenrat head Chaim Rumkowski was particularly inhumane, as he was known to get rid of his political opponents by submitting their names for deportation to concentration camps, hoard food rations, and sexually abuse Jewish girls.Rees, Laurence,Auschwitz: The Nazis and the "Final Solution", especially the testimony of Lucille Eichengreen, pp. 105-131. BBC Books. .Rees, Laurence."Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi state". BBC/KCET, 2005. Retrieved: 01.10.2011. Political theorist Hannah Arendt stated that without the assistance of the Judenräte, the German authorities would have encountered considerable difficulties in drawing up detailed lists of the Jewish population, thus allowing for at least some Jews to avoid deportation. Tadeusz Piotrowski cited Jewish survivor Baruch Milch who wrote that "Judenrat became an instrument in the hand of the Gestapo for extermination of the Jews... I do not know of a single instance when the Judenrat would help some Jew in a disinterested manner." through Piotrowski cautions that "Milch's is a particular account of a particular place and time... the behavior of Junderat members was not uniform." Political theorist Hannah Arendt stated that without the assistance of the Judenräte, the German authorities would have encountered considerable difficulties in drawing up detailed lists of the Jewish population, thus allowing for at least some Jews to avoid deportation. The Jewish Ghetto Police (Jüdischer Ordnungsdienst) were volunteers recruited from among Jews living in the ghettos who could be relied on to follow German orders. They were issued batons, official armbands, caps, and badges, and were responsible for public order in the ghetto. Also, the policemen were used by the Germans for securing the deportation of other Jews to concentration camps."Judischer Ordnungsdienst". Museum of Tolerance. Simon Wiesenthal Center. Retrieved 14 January 2008.Collins, Jeanna R. "Am I a Murderer?: Testament of a Jewish Ghetto Policeman (review)". Mandel Fellowship Book Reviews. Kellogg Community College. Retrieved 13 January 2008. The numbers of Jewish police varied greatly depending on the location, with the Warsaw Ghetto numbering about 2,500, Łódź Ghetto 1,200 and smaller ghettos such as that at Lwów about 500. The Jewish ghetto police distinguished themselves by their shocking corruption and immorality. Historian and Warsaw Ghetto archivist Emanuel Ringelblum described the cruelty of the Jewish Ghetto Police as "at times greater than that of the Germans." thumb|Group 13, a Jewish collaborationist organization in the Warsaw Ghetto, which reported directly to the German Gestapo, 1941 In Warsaw the criminal-collaborationist groups Żagiew and Group 13, led by Abraham Gancwajch and colloquially known as the "Jewish Gestapo", inflicted considerable damage on both Jewish and Polish underground resistance movements. Historian and Warsaw Ghetto archivist Emanuel Ringelblum described the cruelty of the Jewish Ghetto Police as "at times greater than that of the Germans", concluding that this formation's members distinguished themselves by their shocking corruption and immorality. thumb|Group 13, a Jewish collaborationist organization in the Warsaw Ghetto, which reported directly to the German Gestapo, 1941 In Warsaw, the collaborationist groups Żagiew and Group 13, led by Abraham Gancwajch and colloquially known as the "Jewish Gestapo", inflicted considerable damage on both Jewish and Polish underground resistance movements. Over a thousand such Jewish Nazi collaborators, some armed with firearms, served under the German Gestapo as informers on Polish resistance efforts to hide Jews, and engaged in racketeering, blackmail, and extortion in the Warsaw Ghetto.Israel Gutman, The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt, Indiana University Press, 1982, , pp. 90–94.Itamar Levin, Walls Around: The Plunder of Warsaw Jewry during World War II and Its Aftermath, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004, , pp. 94–98. A 70-strong group led by a Jewish collaborator called Hening was tasked with operating against the Polish resistance, and was quartered at the Gestapo's Warsaw headquarters on ulica Szucha (Szuch Street). Similar groups and individuals operated in towns and cities across German-occupied Poland — including Józef Diamand in Kraków and Szama Grajer in Lublin. One of the Jewish collaborationist groups' baiting techniques was to send agents out as supposed ghetto escapees who would ask Poles for help; if they agreed to, the household was reported to the Germans, who (as a matter of announced policy) executed the entire family or arrested those willing to help Jews.Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, [https://arch.ipn.gov.pl/ftp/pamiec_ebooki/REJESTR_faktow_Represji.pdf Rejestr faktów represji na obywatelach polskich za pomocą ludności żydowskiej w okresie II wojny światowej], 2014, pp. 347-50. Retrieved 2018-05-26.Joanna Kierylak, Treblinka Museum, "12 sprawiedliwych z Paulinowa", 2013, retrieved 2018-05-25. It is estimated that at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942 there were some 15,000 "Jewish Gestapo" agents in the General Government. Jewish agent-provocateurs were used by the Germans to bait Jews hiding outside of the ghettos, turn them over to the Germans, and occasionally entrap Poles who were helping the Jews. Perhaps the largest of such actions involved agents from the Żagiew network, who falsely promised Jews hiding in Warsaw following its ghetto's liquidation and who held or were hoping to obtain foreign passports a safe place at Hotel Polski; Around 2,500 Jews came out of their hiding places and moved to the hotel, where they have been captured by the Germans. In another, smaller incident in the village of Paulinów, the Germans used a Jewish agent to pose as an escapee looking for a hiding place with a Polish family, after receiving help the agent denounced the Polish family to the Germans, resulting in the deaths of 12 Poles and several Jews who were hiding with the family.Teresa Prekerowa, Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, "Who Helped Jews during the Holocaust in Poland", Acta Poloniae Historica, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, vol. 76, p. 166. "The gravest provocation involving Jews took place in 1943, some 100 km east of Warsaw; a Jewish Gestapo agent posing as a fugitive was given, or promised, help by 14 inhabitants of the village of Paulinów." Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1997 Joanna Kierylak, Treblinka Museum, "12 sprawiedliwych z Paulinowa", 2013, retrieved 2018-05-25. "Akcja niemiecka, zakrojona na szeroką skalę... Posłużono się tu prowokacją. Rozpoznania dokonali prowokatorzy. Byli nimi Żydzi, jeden z Warszawy, drugi ze Sterdyni – Szymel Helman. Prowokator z Warszawy dołączył do ukrywających się Żydów, podając się za Żyda francuskiego, zbiegłego z transportu przesiedleńców wiezionych do Treblinki." ("[In a] large-scale German operation... use was made of provocation. The scouting-out was done by agent-provocateurs. They were Jews, here one from Warsaw, the other from Sterdyń—Szymel Helman. The agent-provocateur from Warsaw joined some Jews who were in hiding, giving himself out to be a French Jew who had escaped from a transport of deportees who were being sent to Treblinka.")Teresa Prekerowa, Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, "Who Helped Jews during the Holocaust in Poland", Acta Poloniae Historica, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, vol. 76, p. 166. "The gravest provocation involving Jews took place in 1943, some 100 km east of Warsaw; a Jewish Gestapo agent posing as a fugitive was given, or promised, help by 14 inhabitants of the village of Paulinów." Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1997 [?!]Witold W. Mędykowski, "Przeciw swoim: Wzorce kolaboracji żydowskiej w Krakowie i okolicy", Zagłada Żydów - Studia i materiały, Rocznik naukowy Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów IFiS PAN, no. 2 (2006), p. 206. "Zdarzało się jednak, że urządzano prowokacje, by aresztować osoby mające kontakty z podziemiem, pośredniczące przy wyrobie fałszywych dokumentów czy zajmujące się przemytem ludzi i nielegalnym handlem. Na przykład w 1942 roku do Elżbiety Jasińskiej, mającej kontakty z konspiracją, przyszła Marta Puretz, prosząc o wyrobienie kenkarty. Jasińska zgodziła się wyrobić jej ten dokument za 2000 zł. Puretz miała zgłosić się do niej za dwa dni. Kiedy jednak przyszła do niej w umówionym czasie, pod dom zajechało Gestapo, Jasińska została aresztowana, a następnie wywieziona do Auschwitz. Gdy później szwagier Jasińskiej spotkał Martę Puretz na ulicy bez opaski, kazał ją aresztować. Ona jednak na komisariacie policji przy ul. Franciszkańskiej wylegitymowała się dokumentem współpracownika Gestapo i została wypuszczona na wolność. Zagroziła szwagrowi Jasińskiej, że jeśli wejdzie jej w drogę, wsypie go... Podobnie działała Stefania Brandstätter." ("Provocations were organized in order to arrest persons with [Polish] Underground contacts who acted as go-betweens for the production of false documents or who engaged in people-smuggling or illegal commerce. For example, in 1942 Marta Puretz came to Elżbieta Jasińska, who had Underground contacts, and asked to have a Kenkart made. Jasińska agreed to produce the document for 2,000 złotych. Puretz was to come back in two days. But when she did, a Gestapo car pulled up in front of the building, and Jasińska was arrested and subsequently sent to Auschwitz. When Jasińska's brother-in-law later encountered Marta Puretz on the street without a [Star of David] armband, he had her arrested. But at the police station on ulica Franciszkańska [Franciscan Street] she showed a Gestapo-collaborator document and was let go. She threatened Jasińska's brother-in-law that, if he got in her way, she would turn him in... Stefania Brandstätter acted much the same way.") It is estimated that at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942 there were some 15,000 "Jewish Gestapo" agents in the General Government. The agent-provocateur from Warsaw joined some Jews who were in hiding, giving himself out to be a French Jew who had escaped from a transport of deportees who were being sent to Treblinka.") Smaller scale provocations were more common, with Jewish agents approaching Polish resistance members asking for fake documents, followed by Gestapo arresting said resistance members. Some members of Jewish Social Self-Help (Jüdische Soziale Selbsthilfe), also known as the Jewish Social Assistance Society, collaborated with Nazi authorities in the deportation of Warsaw Jews to death camps."Do zachowań jednoznacznie kolaboracyjnych ze strony przedstawicieli żydowskich instytucji 'samorządowych' dochodziło podczas wysiedleń do obozów zagłady w ramach 'akcji Reinhard', gdy niemieckie oddziały wysiedleńcze wymagały od żydowskich funkcyjnych czynnego wspomagania akcji. W Warszawie przy organizowaniu deportacji do obozu zagłady uczestniczyli nie tylko żydowscy policjanci, lecz także członkowie żydowskiej służby ratunkowej, część judenratu, a nawet niektórzy członkowie Żydowskiej Samopomocy Społecznej." ("Unambiguous acts of collaboration on the part of Jewish 'self-government' institutions took place during deportations to extermination camps under 'Operation Reinhard' when German units involved in the expulsions demanded active support from Jewish functionaries. In Warsaw, deporations to extermination camps involved not only Jewish policemen but also members of the Jewish rescue service [Żydowska służba ratunkowa], part of the Judenrat, and even some members of Jewish Social Self-Help.") The group was formed as a humanitarian organization funded by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which also supplied it with legal cover,Alexandra Garbarini, Jewish Responses to Persecution: 1938–1940, p. 198. and was allowed to operate within the General Government. Concerned with its lack of effectiveness, and seeing it as a cover for Nazi atrocities, both Jewish and Polish underground movements actively resisted the organization. Cultural collaboration Film In German-occupied Poland, feature-film showings were preceded by propaganda newsreels of Die Deutsche Wochenschau (The German Weekly Review). Some feature films likewise contained Nazi propaganda. The Polish underground discouraged Poles from attending movies, advising them, in the words of the rhymed couplet, "Tylko świnie siedzą w kinie" ("Only swine go to the movies"). In occupied Poland there was no Polish film industry. However, a few former Polish citizens collaborated with the Germans in making films such as the 1941 anti-Polish propaganda film Heimkehr (Homecoming). In that film, casting for minor parts played by Polish actors was done by Volksdeutscher actor and Gestapo agent Igo Sym, who during the filming, on 7 March 1941, was shot in his Warsaw apartment by the Polish Union of Armed Struggle resistance movement; after the war, the Polish performers were sentenced for collaboration in an anti-Polish propaganda undertaking, with punishments ranging from official reprimand to imprisonment. Some Polish actors were coerced by the Germans into performing, as in the case of Bogusław Samborski, who played in Heimkehr probably in order to save his Jewish wife. Following the Polish underground's execution of Igo Sym, in reprisal the Germans took hostages and, on 11 March 1941, executed 21 at their Palmiry killing grounds. They also arrested several actors and theater directors and sent them to Auschwitz, including such notable figures as Stefan Jaracz and Leon Schiller. Press The legal press was a German propaganda tool. Poles called it gadzinówka ("reptile press"). See also Polish resistance movement in World War II Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II Szmalcownik Trawniki Sonderkommando Sonderdienst Judenjagd References Category:Collaboration during World War II Category:German occupation of Poland during World War II Category:Poland in World War II Gorals and Kashubians thumb|Wacław Krzeptowski, prominent Goralenvolk collaborator, visiting German governor Hans Frank during a celebration held in honor of Hitler's birthday The Germans singled out as potential collaborators two ethnographic groups that had some separatist interests: the Kashubians in the north, and the Gorals in the south. They reached out to the Kashubians, but that plan proved a "complete failure". The Germans had some limited success with the Gorals – establishing the Goralenvolk movement, which Katarzyna Szurmiak calls "the most extensive case of collaboration in Poland during the Second World War." Overall, however, "when talking about numbers, the attempt to create [a] Goralenvolk'' was a failure... a mere 18 percent of the population took up Goralian IDs... Goralian schools [were] consistently boycotted, and... attempts to create a Goralian police or a Goralian Waffen-SS Legion... failed miserably." See also Polish resistance movement in World War II Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II Szmalcownik Trawniki Sonderkommando Sonderdienst Judenjagd References Category:Collaboration during World War II Category:German occupation of Poland during World War II Category:Poland in World War II

Highlight colors show which account likely added that new text: François Robere Piotrus